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The 2008 Center for Homeland Defense and Security (CHDS) Annual Conference 
was conducted January 29-30, 2008, at the Naval Postgraduate School in 
Monterey, California. Its theme, Five Years of Meeting the Homeland Security 
Challenge, was tied to the fifth anniversary of the establishment of CHDS. More 
than 230 CHDS master’s degree and Executive Leadership program alumni, 
partners, sponsors and stakeholders participated in the event.   
The conference featured a keynote speaker; a question and answer plenary 
session with a panel of senior Homeland Defense and Security government 
executives; and three breakout sessions dealing with issues in Intelligence and 
Information Sharing, Border Security, and Public and Private Integration.  
Prior to the conference a call for papers was issued for alumni papers to be 
presented in the breakout sessions along with a call for alumni questions to be 
presented to members of the panel as well as to the keynote speaker. 
Panel Discussion and Questions and Answers 
The panel participants included: 
• Joseph Billy, Jr., Assistant Director, Counterterrorism, Federal Bureau of 
Investigation 
• Dr. Donald Kerr, Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence 
• Brigadier General Christopher Miller, Director of Plans, Policy and 
Strategy, U.S. Northern Command 
• David Paulison, FEMA Administrator, Department of Homeland Security 
• Robert Stephan, Assistant Secretary, Infrastructure Protection, 
Department of Homeland Security 
• Jack Tomarchio, Deputy Under Secretary for Operations, Office of 
Intelligence and Analysis, Department of Homeland Security 
• Peter Verga, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Homeland Defense, 
Department of Defense  
The plenary question and answer session with the panel began with each panelist 
requested to make a statement addressing two over-arching questions, followed 
by an open question and answer session with conference participants. The 
responses of the panelists offer an informal road map for research into the 
homeland defense and security way ahead. The questions and the collective 
responses (bulleted points) were: 
 
Question 1:  What has been accomplished in homeland defense / security? 
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• Improvement in interagency collaboration; all homeland defense/security 
events have ramifications that cross agency boundaries. 
• Improvement in interagency responsibility to share information; the 
absence of terror attacks in the United States since 9/11 is no accident. 
• Creation of agencies, including the Department of Homeland Security and 
U.S. Northern Command, responsible for defending the homeland; pre-
9/11 focus was primarily outside the United States.  
• Realization that domestic intelligence has “taken its place at the table” and 
that the “responsibility” to share intelligence is now a “duty” to share 
intelligence at all levels. 
 
Question 2:  What homeland defense/security challenges do we have ahead of 
us? 
• Keeping our national focus and sustaining the effort; the threat is there 
whether or not we pay attention. 
• Privacy can no longer be equated with anonymity; we must locate threats 
in cyberspace and tie them to events in the physical world. 
• Ability to operate in a dynamic, flexible, changing environment against 
adaptable adversaries. 
• Creation of an integrated interagency planning process; otherwise we will 
not achieve the necessary unity of effort that al Qaeda has demonstrated. 
• Continued protection of individual rights and civil liberties. 
The Keynote Speaker, representing Department of Homeland Security Secretary 
Michael Chertoff, was Edmund S. “Kip” Hawley, Transportation Security Agency 
Administrator. Mr. Hawley’s remarks established two critical points. First, even 
when they work at their best, the nation’s old institutions and methods are not 
adequate to the threats of today. Second, we must find new ways of thinking in 
homeland defense and security. 
INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION SHARING BREAKOUT 
Intelligence and information presentations were facilitated by Chief Patrick 
Miller, Ventura, California Police Department. The 9/11 Commission identified 
several shortfalls in the nation’s ability to conduct intelligence, particularly in the 
area of domestic intelligence. The essential element to creating an effective 
domestic intelligence component is the development of both strategy and 
capability that integrate the nation’s traditional foreign intelligence with 
homeland security centric elements consisting of federal-state-local-private 
organizations. Despite the 9/11 Commission’s findings, several shortfalls 
identified by the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission and other panels on 
the ability of the director of National Intelligence to effect intelligence reform, 
and the National Counter Terrorism Center’s inability to support domestic 
intelligence, have raised concerns whether the nation is more secure six years 
after 9/11. These concerns, along with rising criticism over National Security 
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Agency wiretapping programs and concerns over National Security Letters, 
further contribute to this uncertainty. 
 The first presentation by Lieutenant Commander (USN) James Birch, U.S. 
Northern Command, provided an overview of the history of intelligence in order 
to provide context to his questions on the future of intelligence operations: 
• What is the end state we want in intelligence and how are we going to get 
there? 
• Do organizational mechanisms sharing information and oversight make us 
safer? 
• Does our current reorganization of intelligence organizations put us where 
we want to be in twenty-five years? 
• Where do we get intelligence training for fusion centers and vet analysts? 
• What will be the consequence of a significant mistake by fusion centers? 
Brigadier General Mike McDaniel, Michigan National Guard, gave an overview of 
the evolution of the Michigan Fusion Center and a glimpse of future plans.  
Michigan plans on full integration of an environmental “desk” along with a 
critical infrastructure “desk,” staffing the environmental desk with public health 
and other agencies that investigate and manage the health of the environment, 
and the critical infrastructure desk with National Guard and other 
counterintelligence experts. McDaniel received several questions from the 
audience, including: 
• What do you do about private organizations and sharing sensitive 
information to an individual or organization that is non-law enforcement? 
• How do we develop critical infrastructure/key assets intelligence?   
• Where and how is Michigan going to train their fusion center staff? 
McDaniel shared Michigan’s intent to enter into trusted partnership with the 
private sector, the use of access control alarm monitoring system (ACAMS) at the 
Critical Infrastructure/Key Resources (CI/KR) desk, and the use of the Institute 
for Law Enforcement Administration (ILEA) and the Federal Law Enforcement 
Training Center (FLETC) to train analysts. 
Inspector Kevin Eack, Illinois State Police, discussed the evolution of fusion 
centers and highlighted several fusion center successes in disrupting terrorist 
attacks, sharing with the audience the need to simultaneously maintain the 
successful operation of the centers and share with the public the successful 
disruption of terror plots.   
BORDER SECURITY BREAKOUT 
This session, facilitated by Dr. Robert Bach of the Center for Homeland Defense 
and Security, addressed current issues and challenges to border security, 
specifically maritime mass migration in the Caribbean Basin and current efforts 
to protect the United States-Mexico border. Protecting national borders on land 
or at sea is difficult, if not impossible and entirely unpredictable. The United 
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States has committed billions of dollars in resources and untold man-hours to 
resolve one of the most fervently debated issues in the past decade. However, 
strategies to prevent the terrorist threat via the country’s hundreds of miles of 
unsecured borders and the open seas are not failsafe as illegal aliens continue to 
cross our borders and take to sea at an alarming pace. Particularly, influences of 
determined criminal elements combined with the resolve of immigrants seeking 
relief from years of oppression and political instability opens the door to a 
potential breach in homeland security that is unpredictable at best. But illegal 
immigration, while fueling maddening visions as an ideal mechanism for foreign 
terrorism, may be more appropriately described as a result of political strategy 
and cultural influences both from the home country and the United States.   
As the United States weighs the risk of potential terrorist attacks versus the 
cost to prevent them, it could well be that we are doing to ourselves exactly what 
al Qaeda intended all along: we could become victim of our own policy decisions, 
spending hundreds of billions of dollars on a threat we cannot stop. Realistically, 
the United States will never be converted to a 100 percent Muslim nation; yet we 
continue to pour money into the effort to defend against this “threat” while 
selling the public on the necessity of our actions. Add in the factor of an election 
year and the odds of near-term success in curbing illegal immigration diminish 
significantly.  Prevention of illegal immigration is not popular, but it is costly, and 
costs are difficult to pass on to the public, particularly in an election year. All the 
while, the lack of focus on border security and desperate illegal immigrants 
presents a vulnerability affected by political liability, leaving both the United 
States and illegal immigrants susceptible to exploitation from a very real threat.  
Despite having resources ranging from thousands of personnel from numerous 
federal agencies, to millions of dollars spent on tactical infrastructure, no single 
strategy has proven successful for preventing illegal immigration along the 
United States-Mexico border. Philip Wrona’s presentation outlined numerous 
efforts to protect the border ranging from the Secure Borders Initiative, to REAL 
ID, and the use of unmanned aerial vehicles, resulting in daily seizures of drugs 
and vehicles, and thousands of arrests and deportations. The statistics are 
staggering and the cooperation and involvement of federal agencies is 
unprecedented, yet despite the relative success of programs such as Operation 
Jump Start (scheduled to end summer 2008), these efforts have not stopped the 
flow of illegal immigrants into the country. For every successful intervention, 
immigrants find new routes and methods around barriers; this presents 
challenges for future border security endeavors.   
The paper submitted by Karina Ordóñez, Arizona Department of Homeland 
Security, highlights the way in which the phenomenon of illegal cross-border 
migration continues to rise while smugglers adjust to law enforcement tactics, 
and the primary challenges facing policymakers in developing innovative policies 
to minimize illegal cross-border activity. Ordóñez provides a very clear 
description of the balloon effect along the United States-Mexico border: the 
displacement of illegal cross-border activity to another less secure sector of the 
border as a result of increased apprehension activities in a more secure sector. 
She concludes that the current manner of deployment and employment of 
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resources must be revisited, and tied to accurate use of intelligence, in order to 
increase efficiency and alleviate the potential balloon effect. 
Commander Robert Watts, United States Coast Guard, presented a view of 
current maritime operations to prevent, deter, and intercept maritime mass 
immigration from the Caribbean islands and Cuba. In contrast to Mexican 
national immigration statistics, those from Cuba represent some of the most 
accurate data available. Efforts to interdict Cuban migrants have been highly 
successful but, as on the Arizona-Mexico border, the criminal constituency has 
found new ways to circumvent the system, forming new routes and including 
smuggling networks savvy to the financial incentives available to Cubans 
reaching American soil. While the Coast Guard is well prepared for interdiction, 
issues remain. Avoiding a “Katrina at Sea” mass humanitarian mission is 
paramount, but no single trigger metric exists to forewarn of such a disaster 
because mass migration is dependent on the current political state and  perceived 
treatment of the people in that environment.  Nowhere is this more evident than 
in Cuba where Castro’s advanced age and failing health have put the potential for 
such an event at the forefront.  As in the United States-Mexico border area, 
maritime security involves participation from countless agencies and resources. 
Plans to accommodate the potential hundreds of thousands of Cuban refugees 
seeking asylum in the United States are not without controversy. 
At the conclusion of these presentations, discussions focused on the relative 
threat to homeland security by illegal immigrants and whether illegal 
immigration is truly a homeland security issue. Bach and others raised several 
points: Are the illegal immigrants themselves a threat, or is the potential for 
exploitation by other groups, such as smugglers, the more menacing possibility? 
Should the United States completely close its borders to all immigration?  On the 
other hand, if all illegal immigrants were allowed in at once, how would the 
federal government manage them? As pointed out by several attendees, United 
States attention to foreign immigration problems could blind us to the more 
serious threat of local born terrorists. 
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INTEGRATION BREAKOUT 
This session, facilitated by Stephen Iannucci, managing director for emergency 
preparedness, Bear Stearns, focused on methods and issues of integrating public 
and private interests in homeland security. Discussion recognized that several 
paradigms were altered on 9/11. The provision of security, historically the sole 
responsibility of government, was altered by the realization that private 
companies have a vital role in supporting homeland security strategy. The private 
sector owns and operates approximately 85 percent of the nation’s critical 
infrastructure, possesses significant intellectual capital, and contains vast 
resources that can be applied to supporting various homeland security mission 
areas. Despite the recognition that the private sector is the “first line of defense” 
for critical infrastructure protection in the National Strategy for Homeland 
Security (2007), there remains a concern whether it has been fully incorporated 
as part of the overall national homeland security effort.  Continuing private sector 
concerns over the protection of proprietary and intellectual property, the inability 
to establish information-sharing mechanisms, and the uneven implementation of 
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collaborative venues across the nation to establish public and private integration 
raises concerns whether the private sector is being utilized to its fullest potential. 
Inspector Matthew Simeone, Nassau County Police Department, discussed the 
creation of virtual public-private partnerships between law enforcement and the 
private sector, citing Nassau County, New York, as a successful example. The 
post-9/11 environment has created a need to expand the criminal intelligence 
capabilities of law enforcement agencies beyond everyday crime to include the 
threat of terrorism. Law enforcement success may depend on successful 
partnership with the private sector. With a ratio of 1:400 between law 
enforcement and the private sector, virtual public-private partnerships offer law 
enforcement agencies the potential to expand exponentially their networks for 
collecting and disseminating information. In conjunction with a move towards 
intelligence-led policing, this can lead to better police intelligence products, 
better decision-making, and more effective policing.   
The problem remains that many law enforcement communities are resistant to 
the involvement of private enterprises in what have been traditional police 
matters. However, the high likelihood of crimes occurring within the business 
community makes it essential to incorporate their participation in public-private 
partnerships. Similarly, Simeone cited as reference that today 70 percent of 
Americans use the Internet and more than 190 million emails are sent each day. 
This makes the Internet an important portal for interdisciplinary communication 
and sharing of information between public and private communities. Through 
web portals, emails, and community groups, virtual communities can be created 
which lead to increased social capital and civic engagement between law 
enforcement and the public sector. Much discussion centered on the differing 
definitions and implications of the words “intelligence” and “information” among 
agencies, as well as on concerns over protection of individual rights and civil 
liberties. 
Siobhan O’Neil, Congressional Research Service, discussed the emergence of 
fusion centers, their evolving nature, and the relationship between state and local 
fusion centers and the private sector. The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) 
has called fusion centers part of the creation of a “surveillance industrial 
complex,” which suggests that they have the potential to disregard or abuse 
individual rights and civil liberties. Research by the Congressional Research 
Service, however, suggests that the ACLU statement is incorrect, not warranted, 
and not a reflection of current reality. To the contrary, forces and regulatory 
authorities exist to minimize abuses and the short sightedness of abusers.  Fusion 
centers are narrowly focused and law enforcement oriented, with established 
relationships that they do not want to damage. They are reservoirs for total 
integration that are being established to meet operational and tactical concerns.   
Yet many issues that require integration are not being addressed. Private 
sector entities should be involved, but fusion centers are not being proactive in 
recruiting them. One reason stems from the incorrect information distributed by 
the ACLU about fusion centers; misrepresentation of fusion centers may result in 
the inability to assure a cooperative environment. The development of a matrix of 
staff disciplines, and the establishment of information-sharing protocols, is 
needed. Some fusion centers are beginning to offer permanent seats for industry 
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associations, but the private sector has not accepted a seat because no cost-
benefit analysis has been done to demonstrate the fusion center’s cost 
effectiveness. Discussion revolved around the growing interface between law 
enforcement, information technology, communication, and privacy concerns. 
Questions that need to be addressed are:  How to desensitize information? What 
limitations and standing operating procedures are necessary? Who owns the data 
that fusion centers collect? Can there be transparency between the public and 
private sectors? 
The lack of defining metrics for fusion centers is problematic. Fusion centers 
are unique local and state initiatives that can significantly boost homeland 
security efforts. However, since they have been established to meet local and state 
needs the federal government has been reluctant to place requirements on them.  
Federal guidelines have not been compulsory up to now.  This failure to establish 
common roles, structural requirements, and responsibilities for fusion centers 
leaves open the possibility for both ineffectiveness and civil rights abuses. While 
these concerns have not been realized up to now, the potential for both places the 
future viability of fusion centers at risk.  
Lieutenant Commander Michael (Andre) Billeaudeaux, United States Coast 
Guard, discussed the cultivation of citizen-based communities of practice to build 
partnerships in the maritime domain. He presented concepts developed as a 
result of his assignment in Puerto Rico, where immigration problems were the 
foundation for negative publicity regarding Coast Guard capabilities in the 
maritime domain.  The need was observed for citizen-based community networks 
to act as sensors and develop relationships for the Coast Guard.  The question is:  
How to establish such networks, and what are their ramifications? 
Due to the vastness of the area that the Coast Guard protects and the relatively 
small number of personnel to achieve this mission, alternative surveillance 
techniques and strategies need to be employed. Billeaudeaux’ proposal to utilize 
external citizen-based resources for vigilance and as a source for routine 
information initially met some resistance, but has been increasingly adopted 
throughout the Coast Guard. His study of community of practice measures for 
growing vigilance through social identity, access (vigilance), trust-based social 
capital, goal clarity, and mutual understanding. His argument is that, through a 
variety of media, people are exposed to 20,000 messages per day/per person. The 
Coast Guard can utilize text and non-text portals to communicate with a selected 
group of external sources. His study identified that those who received 
phone/text messages from the Coast Guard demonstrated a higher trust factor, 
and those who had highest trust demonstrated the highest vigilance. Ultimately, 
the use of citizen-based networks as censors offers the Coast Guard increased 
capability to bring security to a dynamic, unwieldy environment where foreign 
ships, their crews, and hundreds of thousands of small vessels operate in and 
around our nation’s critical infrastructure. 
CONCLUSION 
The two day CHDS Annual Conference brought together homeland defense and 
security practitioners and academicians in an academic environment to discuss 
current issues identified as significant by the CHDS Alumni Association.  It 
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produced a professional dialogue over these issues that spanned both horizontal 
integration across multi-disciplinary fields of expertise, and vertical integration 
that incorporated academic, private, local, state, and federal perspectives.  The 
result for the participants was, if not full agreement, at least more comprehensive 
insight and understanding of the homeland defense and security issues that were 
discussed. 
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